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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The Sentence Based Upon Materially False Assumptions Violated State 
and Federal Due Process Rights 
Mr. Hernandez has set out in his Opening Brief how the sentence imposed was based 
upon materially false assumptions. Opening Brief pp. 8-15. The state agrees that a defendant is 
denied due process when the sentencing court relies upon information that is materially untrue or 
when the court makes materially false assumptions of fact. Respondent's Brief p. 5. But, the 
state then argues that in this case the sentence was not based upon information that was 
materially untrue or materially false assumptions of fact. Respondent's Brief pp. 7-23. As 
discussed below, the state's argument is not persuasive and should be rejected. 
One materially false assumption relied upon by the court in sentencing Mr. Hernandez 
was that Mr. Hernandez himself stabbed Ms. Baune. The state first appears to argue that this 
assumption was not relied upon in sentencing because the court did not articulate the assumption 
to Mr. Hernandez until it issued its written order denying Mr. Hernandez's Rule 35 motion. 1 
Respondent's Brief p. 7. The state bases this argument on its observation that nowhere in the 
court's comments imposing sentence did it state that Mr. Hernandez was the person who stabbed 
Ms. Baune. Id. But, of course, not every assumption is stated. In 0. Henry's "The Gift of the 
1 The state also appears to argue that reliance on this materially false assumption could 
not be a violation of due process because Mr. Hernandez could have requested reconsideration of 
his Rule 35 motion and he did not. Respondent's Briefp. 8. However, State v. Morgan, 109 
Idaho 1040, 712 P.2d 741 (1985), found a due process violation on the basis that Mr. Morgan 
was never given a genuine opportunity to prepare and offer responsive information after he 
learned at sentencing that the judge was relying on a materially false assumption. This was true 
even though Mr. Morgan did not file a motion to reconsider the denial of his Rule 3 5 motion. 
The Morgan court wrote, "[W]e hold today that manifest disregard of the Moore [State v. Moore, 
93 Idaho 14, 454 P.2d 51 (1969)] requirements also may be examined despite the lack of an 
objection." 
Magi," Jim assumes that Della loves her hair and would not sell it and Della assumes that Jim 
loves his watch and would not sell it, but neither articulates the assumption to the other and they 
end Christmas Day with an assortment of expensive hair accessories and an expensive watch fob, 
but no long hair and no watch. An assumption does not need to be spoken to be held. 
The state next argues that Mr. Hernandez did in fact admit to stabbing Ms. Baune 
resulting in the fatal injury. Respondent's Brief pp. 8-12. The state first cites to the Amended 
Indictment, R 205, which charged second degree murder. Respondent's Brief p. 8. The state 
seems to argue that because the Amended Indictment charged that Mr. Hernandez did kill Ms. 
Baune by stabbing her multiple times in the chest and head with a knife, and/or inflicting wounds 
from which she died, that in pleading guilty he was admitting stabbing Ms. Baune causing the 
fatal wound. Respondent's Brief pp. 8-12. 
In analyzing this argument, some background is important. As held in State v. Johnson, 
145 Idaho 970, 975, 188 P.3d 912, 917 (2008), "[I]n Idaho, it is unnecessary to allege any facts in 
the charging document other than what is required in a charging document against a principle." 
In other words, the language in the Indictment against Mr. Hernandez was sufficient to charge 
him either as the principal or as an aider and abettor. Thus, an admission to the Indictment was 
not necessarily an admission to being the principal, the person who actually stabbed Ms. Baune 
causing the fatal wound.2 
But, even more importantly to the state's argument, the language of the indictment 
2 It should be noted that Mr. Hernandez's counsel stated that he and the prosecutor had 
discussed and rejected a plea to accessory after the fact or aid and abet. Tr. 8/29/2013, p. 13, ln. 
3-17. However, the reason for that rejection is not specified other than it didn't really fit in the 
parameters he and the prosecutor wanted. Id. Thus, the plea was not necessarily an admission to 
being the person who stabbed Ms. Baune. 
2 
included "and/or inflicting wounds from which she died." In admitting his guilt, Mr. Hernandez 
admitted guilt only to the "or inflicting wounds from which she died." He did not admit guilt to 
stabbing Ms. Baune. 
The state next argues that because the autopsy report gives a cause of death as "multiple 
stab wounds of the head, neck and chest," Mr. Hernandez's statement at the plea hearing that "I 
didn't stab her, but when I went to pick her up I could have inflicted wounds there" was an 
admission to being the person who stabbed Ms. Baune. Respondent's Brief pp. 9-11. This 
argument overlooks the difference between being the person who stabs and the person who 
moves the victim causing aggravation to the stab wounds. This difference is not a "word game" 
as the state puts it. Id. 11. Rather, it is a significant difference. This difference is extreme in this 
case because of the nature of the stab wounds. Ms. Baune was stabbed through her head. State's 
Exhibit 7 in the addendum to the PSI (twelve pages from the end of the PSI) is a color 
photograph showing how the knife was lodged through Ms. Baune's skull. Someone who inflicts 
that sort of wound is different from someone who picks up an already wounded person causing 
new potentially fatal wounds. 
Lastly, the state points out that Mr. Culley did tell a Trooper that Mr. Hernandez had 
stabbed Ms. Baune. Respondent's Brief p. 11. What is also important is that in this interview, 
prior to stating that Mr. Hernandez stabbed Ms. Baune, Mr. Culley reported that he could not 
remember what had happened at Ms. Bourne's residence, that he had been smoking 
methamphetamine for four days prior to her death and had blacked out. Then, Mr. Culley gave 
information supposedly about the murder including that there was a third participant, Aurelio 
Lemus Flores. However, when police investigated Mr. Flores, they discovered that he had never 
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been to Payette, Idaho, and that his time card from his workplace of 20 years showed that he had 
been at work in Kuna, Idaho, at the time Ms. Baune was killed. Mr. Culley told the police that 
Mr. Flores was the first to attack Ms. Baune, hitting her with a hammer and knocking her out. 
PSI 139-140, 143-144. However, the autopsy report does not report any hammer wounds. PSI 
1162-1173. 
With regard to the allegations of the informant that Mr. Hernandez admitted stabbing Ms. 
Baune, those allegations were made by an unknown source with unknown motivations and 
credibility. Respondent's Brief p. 11; Tr. 3/26/14, p. 12, ln. 6-15. As the court itself noted, the 
information had many faults. Tr. 3/25/14, p. 12, ln. 16-20. 
In short, Mr. Hernandez has shown that the district court relied upon a false assumption 
when it sentenced him in the belief that he was the stabber who inflicted the fatal wound. 
With regard to the district court's assumptions regarding lack ofrehabilitative programs 
and job skills training in prisons, and that men do not age out of violent behavior until they are in 
their mid-sixties, Mr. Hernandez relies on his Opening Brief. He does clarify here, as stated in 
his Opening Brief, that the due process violation was not only in the lack of opportunity to 
respond, but also in reliance on information that goes beyond the record and is materially untrue. 
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491,495,681 P.2d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 
165, 172, 997 P.2d 626, 633 (Ct. App. 2000); United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th 
Cir. 1993), all cited and discussed at page 9 of Mr. Hernandez's Opening Brief. 
Mr. Hernandez also relies on his Opening Brief with regard to the question of whether the 
constitutional error in the district court was plain for purposes of State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
245 P.3d 961 (2010). He would just point out that the state's speculation that the district court 
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knows that Mr. Hernandez will not be eligible for rehabilitative services or job training even 
though both are offered at the prison is not supported by any evidence, documentation, or 
anything besides pure speculation. Respondent's Briefp. 16.3 He would also point out that in 
considering whether the failure to object to the reliance on materially false assumptions was a 
tactical decision by counsel that once Mr. Hernandez was sentenced, there was no possible 
downside to objecting to the reliance on materially false assumptions. Mr. Hernandez could 
suffer no ill consequences even if his objection was not well taken by the district court. He 
likewise relies on his Opening Brief with regard to the question of whether remand for 
resentencing is required. 
Mr. Hernandez asks this Court to find that fundamental error occurred when the district 
court sentenced him based upon materially false assumptions. He asks that in light of the error, 
the sentence be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. 
B. The Sentence Imposed was not Predicated on Sound Reasoning and 
Consistent with the Toohill Standards Given it Failed to Take Into Account 
Mr. Hernandez's Role in the Offense, His Age, and the Likelihood of 
Rehabilitation 
Mr. Hernandez relies on the Opening Brief to establish that the district court abused its 
3 The state relies upon State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 320-321, 563 P.2d 42, 44-45 
(1977), for the proposition that this Court should have confidence that a district judge, based on 
knowledge gained from his/her official position has sufficient familiarity with rehabilitative 
options available to certain offenders to know what rehabilitative services and jobs training 
would be open to Mr. Hernandez so as to allow the assumptions made by this district judge. In 
Wallace, the Supreme Court noted that judges may use knowledge gained from their official 
positions as to the number of certain types of criminal transactions that they have observed in the 
courts within their districts and the quantity of drugs involved therein. However, the Supreme 
Court nonetheless remanded Ms. Wallace's case for resentencing because no basis appeared in 
the record for the court's remark relating to her specific involvement in the particular transaction 
she was being sentenced for. 
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discretion in imposing sentence. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Hernandez respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand his case for resentencing. 
J 
Submitted this J-.. day of February, 2015. 
Attorney for Jonathon Hernandez 
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